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Abstract—Wireless Medical Sensor Networks (WMSN) will play
a significant role in the advancements of modern healthcare
applications. Security concerns are still the main obstacle to the
widespread adoption of this technology. Conventional security
approaches, such as authentication and encryption, are able to
defend against external attacks effectively. However, internally
launched threats, either by compromised or selfish nodes, require
further security measures to be detected. In this paper, an
Effective Trend-Aware Reputation Engine (ETAREE) is proposed
for WMSN. ETAREE uses a novel updating mechanism to
evaluate the reputation value, which makes it effective in detecting
malicious nodes. Moreover, the proposed updating mechanism of
ETAREE can efficiently detect on-off attacks. ETAREE security
evaluations have been presented and compared with different
reputation evaluation models, demonstrating faster detection of
malicious behaviours.
Index Terms—Wireless Medical Sensor Networks (WMSN),
security, reputation evaluation, trend-aware, internal attacks, beta
distribution.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless Medical Sensor Networks (WMSN) offer promising
healthcare applications, ranging from monitoring physiological
vital signs to providing telemedicine [1]. WMSN consist of
tiny bio-sensor nodes with wireless communication capability
located on the body surface, inside the body, or in the vicinity of
the body. This cutting edge technology will ease patients’ lives
and help caregivers by alerting them for timely intervention.
Due to the ad hoc nature of the WMSN, the cooperation
between network’s nodes is an imperative issue to ensure the
operability of the network as malicious or selfish nodes may
pose serious threats to the service availability.
WMSN are prone to different types of threats that affect
its operation and consequently endanger the patient’s life. In
addition to its scarcity of resources, WMSN inherit many
security vulnerabilities from Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN).
Cryptographic measures provide advantageous mechanisms to
ensure the confidentiality, integrity and authenticity; however,
it can not be regarded as a sufficient security solution. For
instance, a legitimate node, which is authenticated and may
have a copy of the keys, may get compromised, and thereby
it may selectively forward some packets and drop others. This
significantly degrades the service quality, and can disrupt the
operation of the entire network.
Attacks can be classified into internal and external according
to the attack’s origin. Authentication and encryption schemes
are effective in defeating external attacks [2]. However, they
do not satisfy the security requirements for defeating internal
attacks [3]. Therefore, trust and reputation evaluation systems
are introduced in the literature to detect internal attacks. They
are regarded as promising measures in defending against in-
ternal attacks such as packet forwarding attacks, which can
be launched by compromised or selfish nodes [4]. WMSN are
susceptible to the same internal attacks of WSN; however, data
in WMSN are very critical and sensitive as dropping such
packets may endanger the patient’s life. Packet forwarding
attacks constitute a significant part of the internal attacks
that WMSN may face. Below are the most common packet
forwarding attacks:
• Selective Forwarding Attack: In this type of internal
attacks, the compromised node drops packets intention-
ally based on some criteria it has. For example, it may
drop packets for a particular destination or even from a
particular source [5].
• Sink Hole Attack: This type of internal attacks occurs
when the malicious node is able to attract all the traffic
within the network and then drops all the received packets
[6].
• Black Hole Attack: It is similar to selective forwarding
attack. However, in black hole attack, the malicious node
drops all the received packets [6].
• On-off Attack: One of the smart packet forwarding attacks
where the compromised node alternately changes its be-
haviour between benign and malicious manners in order
to keep itself undetected [7]. Hence, malicious node is
regarded as trusted one while it continues to disrupt the
network operation.
There are mainly two different reasons why some nodes within
the network launch packet forwarding attacks. The first is when
the node is got compromised and intentionally stops forwarding
packets according to the malicious piece of software it has. The
second is when a benign node tend to selfishly stop forwarding
packets for others in order to save power. Regardless of the
reason, packet forwarding attacks pose serious threats that may
endanger the patient’s life. For instance, the dropped packet
may contain a command for an insulin pump to release a dose
of insulin into the blood stream and dropping such a packet has
serious consequences. Hence, an adequate technique to detect
and defeat such attacks is imperative. However, any proposed
scheme should be able to detect attacks as fast as possible
to avoid the serious consequences of continuity of attacks.
Therefore, an effective measure that defend against packets
drop attacks is still an open area of research.
Many trust and reputation schemes are put forward based on
beta distribution in the WSN field. However, in their current
state, they do not fit WMSN due to their prolonged time in
detecting malicious activities [8]. This is not acceptable from
the WMSN perspective due to their critical applications. The
main contribution of this paper is introducing a novel trend-
aware reputation engine termed as ”ETAREE”, which is a mod-
ified beta distribution based reputation engine. ETAREE uses
an efficient updating mechanism based on double exponential
weighting with a view to respond to any change in node’s
behavior and speed up the process of detecting malicious nodes.
Furthermore, It conforms to the resources limitations of WMSN
as the reputation calculation of beta distribution based schemes
is lightweight [9].
The remainder of this paper is organized into six sections
as follows. Related works are given in section II. Section III
presents an overview of the reputation evaluation mechanism.
The reputation engine ETAREE is then introduced in section
IV, followed by performance analysis and comparison results
provided in section V. Finally, section VI concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORKS
Reputation is a process to quantify the neighbors’ behaviour
based on previous interactions. Quantifying the reputation of
nodes in the vicinity has very potential applications ranging
from routing [10] to defeating threats [9]. Reputation evaluation
has been widely investigated in the literature especially for E-
Commerce [11]. However, more attention has to be paid for
WMSN because of its critical applications.
A number of reputation evaluation schemes have been pro-
posed in the literature for WMSN [9] and WSN [12]–[14].
Currently, different types of reputation models are used to
evaluate the reputation value such as fuzzy based [15] and
probability based [12]. However, probability distribution based
reputation models are extensively used because of its robust
mathematical foundation to represent the reputation value;
moreover, it is regarded as a lightweight method [9].
Among all the probability distribution functions, beta proba-
bility distribution attracts more attention because of its simplic-
ity and flexibility to represent different datasets with a variety of
shapes by changing its parameters [16]. However, Exponential
distribution and Binomial distribution are also introduced in the
literature [14], [17].
To the best of our knowledge, authors in [18] are the
first to introduce the beta-based reputation model. Later on,
Reputation-based Framework for Sensor Networks (RFSN) [12]
was introduced as a beta-based reputation framework for WSN.
RFSN is built to integrate new updates into the reputation
evaluation process. Those updates are obtained using a watch-
dog mechanism that collects cooperative and non-cooperative
interactions. RFSN adopts a forgetting mechanism with a view
to give more weight to recent observations. Because of the
effectiveness of the probability based reputation evaluation
system, many improvements are introduced in the literature that
show promising results. However, to the best of our knowledge,
similar updating mechanism is used in those schemes. ReTrust
[9] is another beta distribution based scheme. Authors of
ReTrust define a lightweight and attack resistant scheme to fit
WMSN. ReTrust adopts the sliding time window concept to
evaluate the reputation value, thereby it ignores any historical
interactions beyond the sliding window. Further, the aging
factor is redefined to be a vector where its elements’ number is
equal to the length of the time window and the value of those
elements are exponentially decreasing to underweight earlier
observations. Moreover, with a view to defeat on-off attack,
authors suggest a dynamic aging factor instead of the fixed one.
Authors in TWSN [19] use a different technique to evaluate
the direct trust by calculating the forwarding ratio based on the
accumulated successful and unsuccessful actions. Afterwards,
the forwarding ratio is compared with the previous one in order
to compute the fluctuation of the node behaviour, which will be
used later to evaluate the direct trust using the cosine function.
On the other hand, few research in the literature adopt
different types of probability distribution functions to evalu-
ate the reputation value. Despite using different probability
distribution functions, the reputation value is evaluated using
the same formula of beta-based reputation models. This is
because the reputation value in the beta-based schemes is
defined as the expected value of the probability distribution
while in other schemes, it is computed as the maximum value
of the probability distribution. BDTMS [17] is a binomial
distribution based reputation scheme for WSN oriented to the
healthcare applications, whilst ETRES [14] uses the exponential
distribution to represent the reputation value. Both BDTMS and
ETRES use the same weighting mechanism to underweight old
observations.
III. REPUTATION EVALUATION
In this section, an overview of the probability based reputa-
tion model is presented.
A. The Definition of Reputation
Defining trust and reputation is still an open issue [20]. Trust
can be defined as having an adequate confidence on the others’
future behaviour while Reputation is the perception that others
do not have any intention to change their known behaviour.
Although reputation and trust are used interchangeably some-
times in the literature, there is a difference between them.
Reputation value is usually inferred from the behaviour history
while calculation of trust value is a subjective expectation that
may consider more factors, which are not necessarily related
to the trustee. As the reputation relationship is usually built
between two parties for a specific action, the first party that
maintains the reputation value is referred to as a subject while
the second party that performs the action is referred to as
an agent [9]. Therefore, the notation R(subject:agent,action) is
used to refer to the reputation value maintained by the subject
node for an agent node. Fig. 1 illustrates the aforementioned
notation and highlights how reputation-based trust could be
evaluated. Actions can be any service provided by an agent
to a subject such as packets forwarding, which will be the case
in this paper. In such case, the subject observes the agent’s
behaviour and then evaluates the agent’s reputation value based
on the number of successful and unsuccessful actions. It is
worth mentioning that the two terms behaviour and action are
used interchangeably throughout this paper.
The successful and unsuccessful actions form two series
where each time unit contains the number of successful and
unsuccessful actions, respectively. These two series are used
to update the reputation value periodically. The updating
mechanism allows nodes in the network to detect malicious,
compromised, selfish or even faulty nodes and thereby exclude
them from any further cooperation for example.
B. Bayesian Reputation Model
The reputation value maintained by the subject represents
a belief that the subject predicts the agent’s future behaviour
based on it in a manner that reduces the uncertainty. The
Bayesian reputation model assumes that the behaviour of the
agent can be estimated based on a probability distribution. The
expected value of the probability distribution represents the
reputation value, which gets updated once new observations
are available using Bayes’ theorem [8]. Therefore, the updated
(posterior) parameters of the probability distribution function
is calculated by adding the previous (prior) version of the
parameters to the current observations.
C. Beta Distribution Based Reputation Model
As the actions monitored by the subject have two different
states (forwarded or dropped), these observations could be
regarded as a sequence of trials that have binary outcomes (Suc-
cessful, Unsuccessful), which form a binary space of disjoint
elements. Therefore, the binomial Bayesian reputation system
can be modeled using a Beta Probability Density Function
(PDF) [21].
IV. ETAREE REPUTATION EVALUATION MODEL
In this section, an Effective Trend-Aware Reputation Evalu-
ation Engine (ETAREE) for WMSN is proposed. ETAREE is a
novel reputation evaluation model based on double exponential
weighting.
Fig. 1. Reputation and Trust
A. Motivation
Each action is done by trustee represents a Bernoulli trial
with two possible outcomes. Beta distribution provides a
lightweight computational method to evaluate the posterior
probability based on a conjugate prior compared with Bayesian
inference. Updating the beta model when new observations
are available is more efficient than Bayesian inference. How-
ever, as the reputation value evaluated using beta distribution
represents a long-term value, it takes long time to detect
malicious behaviour [8]. This behaviour does not fit the security
requirements of WMSN because of the critical application
they provide. Slowness in detecting malicious nodes affects the
patient’s health negatively and may threaten the patient’s life.
B. Beta-based Reputation Evaluation
Beta probability distribution provides a robust basis for
reputation evaluation on the theory of statistics [18]. The beta
probability density function, which is defined in Eq. 1, is a
continuous probability distribution of the probability variable
px over the interval [0,1]. It is parameterized by α and β, which
get updated based on the binary outcomes of the observed
actions.
f(px|α, β) = Γ(α+ β)
Γ(α)Γ(β)
pα−1x (1− px)β−1
where

0 ≤ px ≤ 1
α > 0
β > 0
(1)
There are two restrictions for Eq. 1. The first is px 6= 0 if
α < 1, and the second is px 6= 1 if β < 1. The expected value
of the Eq. 1 represents the reputation value and is defined in
Eq. 2.
Repij = E(px)
=
α
α+ β
(2)
where Repij represents the reputation value maintained by
subject i for the agent j, E(px) is the expected value of the beta
distribution, x represents the outcome of successful actions, α
and β are the probability distribution function shape parameters
and they represent the updated versions of the successful and
unsuccessful actions between the subject i and the agent j,
respectively.
Once the system is initialized, it is expected that no obser-
vations are obtained, thereby it is important to initialize the
reputation value. Authors in [12] suggest the following initial
value when there is no prior knowledge:
Repij = E[uni(0, 1)] (3)
This means when no observations are available, the probability
variable is uniformly distributed over the interval [0,1] and the
initial reputation value is 0.5, and thereby the reputation value
is evaluated using Eq. 4.
Repij =
α+ 1
α+ β + 2
(4)
C. Traditional Beta Updating Mechanism
Let us consider the Body Sensor Network (BSN) illustrated
in Fig. 2. This two-hop star topology represents the first tier
of communication of WMSN. Node i is not in the direct
communication of the sink node. Nodes j and k have the
capability to relay packet for end nodes such as i. Therefore,
subject i evaluates agents j and k for the packet forwarding
action. Let s be the number of observations of successful
actions and u to be the number of observations of unsuccessful
actions in the time unit t. Thereby the reputation value of the
agent j, which is maintained by the subject i is given by Eq.
5:
Repij = E[
Γ(α+ s+ β + u)
Γ(α+ s)Γ(β + u)
pα+s−1x (1− px)β+u−1]
= E[Beta(α+ s, β + u)]
(5)
It is clear that the updated reputation value can be obtained
by updating the two parameters α and β as shown in the two
equations below:
αt = αt−1 + s (6)
βt = βt−1 + u (7)
Fig. 2. Network setup
The aforementioned updating mechanism gives equal weight
to all past observations, and thus it is not able to reflect
recent changes in behaviour. Another issue is that α and β are
accumulated over the time and thereby more memory would be
required, which violates the resources constraints of WMSN.
Therefore, longevity factor λ, also known as forgetting factor
or aging factor, is introduced. Longevity factor is a decay factor
widely used in the literature to give more weight to the new
observations [12], [14], [18].
αt = λ.αt−1 + s (8)
βt = λ.βt−1 + u (9)
where 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1. This updating technique that gives more
weight to the recent observations and decreases the weight
slowly over the time is called Single Exponential Smoothing
(SES). Fig. 3 shows how beta-based reputation engine reflects
the reputation value using different longevity weights for be-
nign and malicious nodes.
D. Trend-Aware Updating Mechanism
The reputation value evaluated by the beta-based reputation
model responds slowly to changes in the agent’s behaviour.
Fig. 4 depicts how beta-based reputation model responds to
a simple change in agent’s behaviour. A sequence of 10 time
units where the agent provides successful actions followed by
another 10 time units of unsuccessful actions. It takes 10 time
units for beta-based reputation model without longevity weight
to reach the threshold, which is set to 0.5, while it takes 7 time
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Fig. 3. The beta-based reputation model with different longevity weights for
benign and malicious nodes
units for the beta-based reputation with 0.9 longevity weight to
exceed the threshold value. Adversary can take advantage of the
long detection period to destroy the network or even to launch
more complicated attacks such as on-off attack. Note that using
small longevity factor is not recommended because the subject
forgets the behaviour history quickly, and consequently allows
the adversary to launch attacks leveraging its reputation value.
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Fig. 4. The beta-based reputation model for 10 good observations followed
by 10 bad ones
1) Double Exponential Weighting: In order to reduce the
time required to detect malicious behaviour of the beta-based
reputation model, and thereby enhance the detection rate, the
trend of the agent’s behaviour has to be considered. ETAREE
considers the exponentially smoothed difference between two
subsequent time units of the agent’s behaviour by evaluating
the additive slope of the successful and unsuccessful series.
Therefore, ETAREE uses double exponential weights λ1 and
λ2 as opposed to a single weight in models proposed in the
literature. Taking into account that the difference between two
subsequent time units is always one, Eq. 10-13 show the pro-
posed updating mechanism where the levels (beta distribution
shape parameters) αt and βt are updated by considering the
slope between the two subsequent time units, which represents
the difference between observations for each series.
αt = λ1(αt−1 + bt−1) + (1− λ1)st (10)
bt = λ2(αt − αt−1) + (1− λ2)bt−1 (11)
βt = λ1(βt−1 + dt−1) + (1− λ1)ut (12)
dt = λ2(βt − βt−1) + (1− λ2)dt−1 (13)
where bt and dt are the slopes at the time unit t for the
successful and unsuccessful series, respectively, λ1 and λ2 are
the weighting coefficients and (0 ≤ λ1 ≤ 1, 0 ≤ λ2 ≤ 1), st
and ut are the number of observations at the time unit t of the
successful and unsuccessful actions, respectively.
Slopes bt and dt may have negative values depending on the
series, whereas reputation value must be positive within the
interval [0, 1]. Therefore, the Eq. 10 and Eq. 12 are written as
follows:
αt = α
+
t (14)
βt = β
+
t (15)
where α+t and β
+
t are the positive part of the real value and
are defined as:
f+t =
|ft|+ ft
2
(16)
2) Reputation Engine Initializing: There are two points to
consider upon system initialization. The first is the initial
reputation value, which has been discussed earlier to overcome
the case where no observations are available. The second is
related to our proposed reputation engine as computing the
slope needs at least two time units of observations.
The reputation value evaluated using the Eq. 4 considers
adding the value 1 to both αt and βt to ensure that the initial
reputation value is 0.5 at the beginning; further, this formula is
usually adopted by schemes that consider the reputation over
a predefined time window, because it protects the system from
division by zero problem when no observations are available
for the whole time window. On the other hand, adding 1 to
the numerator and 2 to the denominator will influence the
reputation value especially when the number of observations
is limited as depicted in Fig. 5
In ETAREE, the reputation value is evaluated using the
formula in Eq. 2, which is simpler and does not influence
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Fig. 5. The difference between reputation values evaluated using Eq. 2 and
Eq. 4 over 10 time units
the reputation value. However, to overcome the aforementioned
problems and assign the proper initial value, ETAREE assumes
a predefined time unit t0 where the number of successful and
unsuccessful actions are set to 1 as illustrated in Fig. 2.
Assuming that ETAREE is applied from the origin where
no actual observations are available except the predefined
observations in the time unit t0, the initial slopes’ values will
be as follows:
bt0 = dt0 = 0 (17)
bt1 = st1 − st0 (18)
dt1 = ut1 − ut0 (19)
where st and ut are the number of observations in the time unit
t for both successful and unsuccessful actions, respectively.
V. EVALUATION
In this section, the security effectiveness of ETAREE rep-
utation engine is presented. In order to assess our proposed
reputation engine, ETAREE has been implemented using MAT-
LAB platform. Since RFSN [12] is considered the benchmark
scheme [14], ETAREE has been contrasted with it. Moreover,
a comparative analysis with [19] and [9] is presented. The
results show that ETAREE is more dynamic and can reflect
behavioural changes into the reputation value faster than other
schemes. Moreover, ETAREE is able to detect low packets drop
rates compared with other schemes. Hence it is more efficient
to defend against malicious behaviour such as packets dropping
in WMSN.
As discussed earlier, all nodes are initially regarded as good
nodes and assigned the same reputation value 0.5 by setting one
successful action and one unsuccessful action at the time unit
t0. Choosing the same value for successful and unsuccessful
actions is mandatory to initialize the reputation value to 0.5;
however, the bigger the value is, the more influence it has on
the next reputation values.
BSN consists of sensor nodes where one of them acts as
a sink. According to [22], BSN is a two-hop star topology
where all sensor nodes send their sensed medical data to the
sink. In this star topology, nodes, which are in the direct
communication with the sink, have to relay packets for others.
Therefore, to assess reputation in such a network topology, two
different approaches are considered, centralized and distributed,
where both have their pros and cons. ETAREE is a distributed
reputation engine where an instance of it is installed in each
node. Our experiments adopt the network topology illustrated
in Fig. 2, where node i is not in a direct communication with
the sink node; therefore, it has to send its packets to either node
j or node k in order to be relayed to the sink node. Subject i
maintains reputation values for both agents j and k.
Taking into account the aforementioned factors, subject i
evaluates the reputation of agent j and/or agent k in the
following scenarios. Table I shows the used parameters of each
scheme where the same longevity factor is used to allow fair
comparison. Moreover, we adopt the values of the schemes’
parameters as declared in each scheme publication where
available. Regarding ETAREE, λ1 is set to 0.8 as it presents
the longevity factor, λ2 is set to 1 as in WMSN our highest
priority is to detect malicious behaviours as fast as we can. The
threshold is set to 0.5 to differentiate between malicious and
benign nodes as this value is widely adopted in the literature.
Note that all the evaluated reputation values are the direct
reputation values as the indirect reputation evaluation is out
of the scope of this paper.
TABLE I
PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS PARAMETERS
Scheme Performance Analysis Parameters
RFSN [12] λ=0.8
ReTrust [9] φ=0.9, TW(Time Window)=6 time units
TWSN [19] α = 0.9, β = 0.8
ETAREE λ1=0.8, λ2=1.0
A. Scenario 1
In the first scenario, we assume that the subject i is evalu-
ating two different agents j and k. one of them is behaving
good while the second one is behaving bad throughout the
evaluation process. Agents j and k are initially assigned the
same reputation value of 0.5 as the time unit t0 is preset to
(1,1) actions. A threshold value is set to 0.5. Fig. 6 illustrates
the reputation evaluation of ETAREE in contrast with RFSN,
ReTrust and TWSN.
The results show that all the evaluated schemes are de-
veloping the reputation value gradually for both benign and
malicious agents over the time. However, ETAREE reflects the
best performance among them for both good and malicious
agents by giving the lowest reputation value for the malicious
agent and the highest reputation value for the good agent,
thereby it converges to 0 or 1 better than other schemes. While
RFSN and TWSN performs closely, ReTrust, in the first five
time units, performs in a similar way; however, when the first
time window is formed as the Time Window (TW) is set to 6,
ReTrust tends to underestimate the reputation value of the good
agent and overestimate the reputation value of the malicious
agent.
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Fig. 6. The reputation evaluations for good and malicious nodes
B. Scenario 2
The second scenario depicts how each scheme responds to a
sudden change in agent’s behaviour. We assume that the subject
i is evaluating agent’s j behaviour. Agent j is behaving in a
good manner in the phase I between the time units 1 and 15,
then suddenly it behaves maliciously. As in the first scenario all
schemes are initialized with the same reputation value and the
same threshold. Our proposed scheme ETAREE is compared
with RFSN, ReTrust and TWSN.
Fig. 7 presents the reputation evaluation of the second sce-
nario. All schemes demonstrate a similar behaviour to the first
scenario during the first phase. However, during the malicious
phase, RFSN and ReTrust show approximately similar reactions
to the malicious behaviour, although ReTrust shows faster
detection as it needs 5 time units to pass the threshold. TWSN
fails to detect the attack in the malicious phase as it converge
to just above 0.6 at the time unit 25. RFSN and ReTrust
converge to around 0.3 and 0.2, respectively. On the other hand,
our proposed scheme ETAREE reaches the threshold within 4
time units and converge to 0 within 6 time units. Moreover,
it is clear that while the malicious agent continues its bad
behaviour, ETAREE, unlike other schemes, tends to decrease
the reputation value further over the time, which allows it to
detect attack for even lower threshold.
C. Scenario 3
In this scenario, the on-off attack will be evaluated where the
malicious node is aware that the punishment for any malicious
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Fig. 7. The reputation evaluations when an agent changes its behaviour from
good to bad
activities is temporary as it is able to redeem itself and get back
again to the network by showing good behaviour alternately.
During the reputation evaluation process, Node k is running an
on-off attack that contains two on(s) and two off(s) periods,
and the attack cycle is 10 time units. During the on phase,
node k acts maliciously and drops packets that it is expected
to forward them. Our proposed scheme ETAREE is contrasted
with RFSN, ReTrust and TWSN for the same initial reputation
value and threshold.
The reactions to on-off attack for all the aforementioned
schemes are illustrated in the Fig. 8. In the first phase where
the agent is acting in a cooperative manner, all schemes
demonstrate similar behaviour. One point to highlight in this
phase is, ETAREE is the only scheme that is able to converge
to 1 and reflect the actual reputation value among others. During
the first on period, it is obvious how RFSN and TWSN are not
able to detect the attack, while ReTrust reaches the threshold
after 3 time units. On the other hand, ETAREE is able to
exceed the threshold with the same time units of ReTrust.
Afterwards, ETAREE shows a very dynamic behaviour in
contrast with other schemes by reflecting the agent’s good
behavior. However, this dynamicity in reflecting cooperative
behaviour does not prevent ETAREE from detecting malicious
agent, which is running the on-off attack during the second on
period. By the end of the second on period, the reputation value
of RFSN and ReTrust converge to around 0.2 while TWSN fails
to detect the attack as it converges to just above 0.6. On the
other hand, ETAREE converges to 0 after just 5 time units,
which allows it to detect attacks even for lower threshold.
D. Scenario 4
In this experiment, we evaluate the detection speed of the
aforementioned schemes for different packets drop rates. The
second scenario is run multiple times by decreasing the packets
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Fig. 8. The reputation evaluations under on-off attack
drop rate by 10% each time. The same initialization and
threshold are used. Fig. 9 illustrates the required time for each
scheme to detect the attack.
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Fig. 9. The attack detection speed
TWSN shows longer time to detect the attack with a re-
markable rise each time the packets drop rate decreases. Other
schemes, including ETAREE, detect attacks by approximately
the same time units at the beginning; however, ETAREE shows
better performance by decreasing the packets drop rate. On the
other hand, by decreasing the drop rate, TWSN fails to detect
attacks when the rate is less than 60%, while RFSN and ReTrust
are still able to detect attacks down to 50%. Most importantly,
ETAREE is the only scheme that is able to detect attacks with
packets drop rate as low as 30%, which makes it more effective
and robust comparatively.
VI. CONCLUSION
Reputation evaluation measures are considered an effective
method to defend against packet forwarding attacks and detect
malicious or selfish activities. Beta-based reputation model
offers a promising solution; however, it takes a prolonged
time to detect compromised or selfish nodes. Our proposed
reputation engine, ETAREE for short, presents a suitable so-
lution. In ETAREE, we adopt a double exponential weighting
updating mechanism with a view to make beta-based reputa-
tion evaluation model faster in detecting malicious activities.
ETAREE demonstrates promising results compared with RFSN,
ReTrust and TWSN. On the other hand, adversary could take
advantage of the dynamicity of reflecting behavioural changes
from malicious to benign to launch more sophisticated attacks.
Moreover, ETAREE still needs further evaluations within a trust
system that considers indirect recommendations from other
nodes in the vicinity, which will be part of our future research.
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